



FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIII, No. 50

SEPTEMBER 29, 1944

IS U.S. WORKING WITH DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN EUROPE?

THE approach of military victory in Europe has forced the Allies, after what seem regrettable delays, to focus their attention on the use to be made of victory. And this, in turn, should cause us all furiously to think. What kind of a Europe do we hope to see emerge from the war? What future do we envisage for Germany?

IS U.S. READY FOR RECONVERSION? But before we answer these questions, let us first ask this: at a time when our resources of industry and manpower are promising us victory over our enemies, are we sure we have won a victory over ourselves—over our shortsightedness, our selfishness, our sloth? We are talking of reconversion from war to peace, of beating tanks into vacuum cleaners. But have we learned to reconvert human relations? Do we know any more than we did before 1939 about the frictions and conflicts that generate wars among nations? Are we better prepared than we were at that time to play an active part in any effort that may be undertaken by all the nations to alleviate such frictions and conflicts in the future?

To give a blunt "no" to these questions would be to resign ourselves to the idea that any attempt at improvement is foredoomed to failure. And resignation is not in the temper or tradition of the American people. But to answer confidently "yes" would be to mislead ourselves, our allies, and our enemies. Most of us have remained, throughout this war, too far from direct experience of suffering and terror to look squarely at a future which may not be all rosy. There is still a predisposition to hope that the major operations necessary to transform a war-torn world into a world fit for human beings to live in can be performed in some remote, antiseptic operating room, with no other shock to our sensibilities than the necessity of having to share in paying the bill.

PITFALLS TO WATCH. The danger of perpetuating such illusions is so great that it seems im-

perative to point out some of the pitfalls we should be on watch for in these critical days when every move we make determines the character of the post-war period:

1. Most Americans still regard events in Europe as a spectacle—thrilling to some, disheartening to others. Many act as if they do not realize that those who are being killed there—including our own men—are living human beings, not characters in novels. There is still an astonishing feeling of unreality here about what has been going on in Europe for five heartrending years.

2. This feeling of unreality leads many of us to view our part in the European war once more as a temporary experience—an interlude of arduous military effort in the midst of otherwise uninterrupted material progress. It has not yet been felt as an experience shared in common with other, less fortunate, peoples. We have gone overseas to do a certain job—but plan to come back, and come back to a country that has remained intact. "Overseas" has not yet become our permanent concern. In this attitude lie the seeds of renewed isolationism.

3. The United States, since the Civil War, has achieved the closest approximation to popular democracy of any great nation, with the least internal disturbances. If this achievement were correctly reflected in our policy toward other nations, the United States would enjoy today a position of leadership unchallengeable by Russia or Britain. For reasons it is difficult to analyze fully—cross-currents of opinion, administrative bottlenecks, economic misapprehensions, and so on—the inherently democratic temper of our people is by no means always communicated to other nations, except at the lower "levels," as they are called in diplomacy, of our official representatives.

It would have been heartening to those Europeans who are striving to find a democratic way out of the ruins of Hitler's "new order" if the United States, at this historic moment, could send to the liberated countries representatives symbolizing the concepts of democracy for which we believe, and assert, we are fighting: men who would be ready to associate not only with the handful of wealthy and irresponsible socialites found in every country—many of whom proved easy prey to Nazi blandishments—but also with the men and women, perhaps unkempt, perhaps unused to drawing-room graces, who have been the rank and file of our true allies within conquered Europe. The appointment of such representatives—and surely many can be

found in this country—to diplomatic posts in Europe would be more eloquent evidence of our attitude than scores of documents or dozens of after-dinner speeches about our devotion to democratic principles.

4. What is said of our attitude toward the forces of democracy can also be said of our attitude toward the Roman Catholic Church in Europe. This is a delicate subject to broach. Yet it has been broached so insistently by certain newspaper correspondents writing from Rome that it can no longer be regarded as a diplomatic secret. It is entirely understandable that, in seeking to find institutions that might bridge the gap between totalitarianism and the revival of popular government, Britain and the United States should see in the Vatican, which has survived the storms of centuries, a bulwark against anarchy.

The Church has played, and will continue to play, an important part in European affairs. But the Church itself is not monolithic. It, too, is composed of diverse elements, some liberal, some reactionary. It so happens, for a number of reasons, that the hierarchy of several European countries—notably France—has displayed a clearer understanding of the issues at stake in the crisis of our times than has been expressed, on occasion, at the Vatican or among some Catholics in the United States. It would be a curious paradox if this country, for the sake of achieving order in Europe, should drift into the position of supporting on the continent Catholic policies which represent the less enlightened elements among European Catholics. Order is highly desirable. But it will not be achieved by attempts to stifle the demands of those who have resisted Fascism and Nazism for improvement in the lot of the masses.

5. All these considerations have a direct bearing on our attitude toward Germany. Such decisions as may have been reached by the United States, Britain and Russia in the European Advisory Commission, or by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at Quebec, are not known to the public, but reports from London and Washington cannot be described as anything but disquieting. There is an almost irresistible tendency on the part of human beings who recognize they made a mistake in the past to adopt exactly the opposite policy when a similar situation presents itself once more. Many people believe that the reason Germany resorted to war in 1939 is because the policy of the Allies in 1919 proved too "soft"—if not in intention, at least in execution. So now they urge a policy of extreme harshness. Yet even a superficial study of the inter-war years should

convince us that the reason war came within a quarter of a century was because the Allies did not agree among themselves at the outset concerning their policy toward Germany, and made no effective attempt to create a strong international organization that could have checked the rise of a militant Germany. We could, of course—because we shall have the military power at our command—adopt a "hard" policy. We could dismember Germany, destroy its industries, keep its people in subjection for many years, and force them to live at a low standard of living in small agricultural communities—but at the end of the next twenty-five years we would be no nearer to averting war than we were in 1939. Why? Because we would have dodged once more the central issue. We would have furnished the Germans with every possible incentive to engage in war. Yet we would have created no machinery by which war might be prevented through the orderly adjustment of conflicts that we know to be inevitable among human beings; nor would we have altered the climate of ideas in which Nazi propaganda flourished.

A subsequent article will discuss possible ways of dealing with Germany. The essential thing to bear in mind is that, unless we have convictions of our own about the future of Europe, we shall be unable to make intelligent—or intelligible—choices between alternative policies that may be submitted to us at any point. True, we cannot reach decisions alone. We must find a basis of agreement with Britain, Russia, and other countries. But unless we know our own minds, how do we expect to influence the minds of others? We believe in democracy, and urge others to practice it. Yet some of us shrink from it when we meet it in other lands, raw-boned, and unadorned by the trappings of tradition. If we do not want to see the revival of Nazi ideas in Germany and on the continent, we must have the courage of our convictions—we must learn to recognize those who share our political faith and help them, instead of discouraging them by lukewarm indecisiveness.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The fourth in a series on Europe's problems as seen from the United States.)

TERMS FOR AXIS SATELLITES BOLSTER RUSSIA'S SECURITY

With Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria—the three Axis satellites that have been torn away from Germany within the past three weeks—engaged in fighting the Nazis, the end of the war in the east has been brought one step closer. This turnabout by Germany's former partners, resulting from the Allies' demand for cooperation against the Nazis as a preliminary condition for an armistice, may be of considerable military importance in the immediate future. Of longer range significance, however, are the territorial provisions in the various armistice arrangements, for they help fill in the picture of eastern Europe as it will emerge from the war. In the terms of the armistices which the Russians, acting with the approval of the other Allies, have signed with their three small neighbors, one recurrent theme is found. This is Russia's intention to emerge from World War II

with territorial settlements that strengthen its strategic position on the Baltic, the Black Sea and in the Balkans.

FINLAND AND THE BALTIC. The U.S.S.R.'s determination to secure mastery of the Baltic Sea, which has been virtually under German control since World War I, is the main consideration underlying the territorial provisions of the armistice Russia and Britain made with Finland on September 19. In terms roughly comparable to those offered last spring, the Russians require the Finns to give them a long-term lease for a naval base on the Gulf of Finland. Instead of the Hangoe Peninsula, however, which the Russians obtained on a 99-year lease at the end of the 1940 war and to which they now renounce all rights, the U.S.S.R. secures a 50-year lease to the more easterly Porkkala Peninsula that commands the narrow

est part of the Gulf of Finland. Other portions of the armistice based on strategic considerations are Russia's claims to the nickel mines and port of Petsamo and the northern and western approaches to Leningrad. From the Russian point of view these are easily understandable demands, since German submarines based on Petsamo attacked Allied supplies on the way to Murmansk, and the Nazis' long siege of Leningrad was materially aided by the possibility of approaching the city from Finnish soil. But it is also clear why the Finns should consider the loss of their easternmost region as one of the heaviest burdens of the armistice, for this area includes the most industrialized part of Finland and more than one-tenth of the nation's total population. Although, therefore, the Finnish armistice may be characterized as fundamentally strategic rather than punitive in purpose, since it permits Finland to retain the major bases of its wealth, Russia's security is purchased at a high cost to Finland.

The reparation bill charged to the Finns has aroused comment chiefly because it has been whittled down to half that mentioned in earlier negotiations. However, even at its present figure of \$300,000,000 worth of goods, to be paid over a period of six years, its collection will present many problems. Before 1939 Russia annually took only approximately \$3,000,000 worth of Finnish goods. To pay the required amount, Finland would not only have to reorient its trade almost entirely in the direction of Russia, but it would also have to take other drastic steps. In most of the defeated countries it seems doubtful that a national government—unless subjected to Allied controls—could remain in power if it tried to carry out such measures. Finland, however, appears so determined to avoid Russian supervision that it may be able to enforce the policies demanded by the reparation program.

RUMANIA AND THE BLACK SEA. The armistice with Rumania which the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States signed on September 12 also reflects the Russians' concern with their strategic position. According to its terms, Russia reclaims Bessarabia, a former part of the Tsarist empire and an area of considerable military importance because it flanks the Black Sea port of Odessa. In 1941, it will be recalled, the Germans' capture of Odessa was facilitated by Rumania's partnership with the Axis. However, in compensation for the loss of Bessarabia and adjoining northern Bukovina—and in an apparent effort to nullify all territorial settlements made by the Axis—Rumania is promised the return of almost all of

Transylvania, which it was forced to cede to Hungary at Hitler's dictation. Like the Finns, the Rumanians are also required to pay Russia \$300,000,000 reparation—a sum that apparently would have been larger if Rumania had not agreed to join the Red Army—and an additional amount, not yet determined, to the other Allies.

BULGARIA AND THE BALKANS. Although Russia's four-day war with Bulgaria ended on September 9, the Bulgarians have not yet received definite armistice terms. Despite this delay, however, Bulgaria continues to hope that its penalties will be light, for the great majority of its people remained so strongly pro-Russian throughout the war that the government in Sofia never felt it possible to declare war on the Soviet Union and had to content itself with sending "volunteers" to Hitler. Moreover, the Bulgarians realize that their country does not lie at one of the important gateways to Russia. Aside, therefore, from possible demands for Black Sea bases, the U.S.S.R.'s attitude toward Bulgaria will not be shaped by strategic considerations. Instead, Russia may be expected to follow a policy designed to cultivate the traditional pro-Russian sympathies of this Balkan nation.

In describing Russia's plans to insure its security through the territorial changes it has imposed—with the consent of its Western allies—on Finland and Rumania and may require of Bulgaria, it is only fair to point out that these terms remain essentially the same as those Russia made in 1939-40, before it won the great military victories that followed the Battle of Stalingrad. Moreover, while the Soviet Union has worked out a peace settlement on its western borders which rests on territorial guarantees, it has also cooperated with Britain and the United States in creating an international security organization at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL


ANNUAL FORUM

On Saturday, October 7, the annual Forum of the Association will be held at The Waldorf-Astoria on the theme, "Program for Security." Among the speakers at the Forum will be Dr. James B. Conant, who will discuss at luncheon the effective disarmament of Germany and Japan; Mr. C. W. Taussig, Miss Craig McGeachy and the Hon. L. B. Pearson reporting on functioning international organizations at the morning session; and the Hon. Harold B. Butler, the Hon. Henri Hoppenot and the Hon. Harry D. White speaking on future international cooperation at the afternoon session.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIII, No. 50, SEPTEMBER 29, 1944. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; DOROTHY F. LEET, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



U.S. TAKES REALISTIC VIEW OF CHINA'S PLIGHT

When the coming campaign to defeat Japan was discussed at the Quebec conference, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill probably did not overestimate the part Chinese troops can play in that undertaking. For while the United Nations scored remarkable successes in Europe and in the Pacific during the summer, the armies of China have fallen back slowly before Japanese advances except in Burma and in Yunnan. Late in May the Japanese armies in China opened a drive south of Yochow toward Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, and within little more than three weeks that town fell. Mounting Allied victories in other quarters distracted attention from the enemy's determined progress below Changsha until mid-September, when the approach of the Japanese caused the United States Army's 14th Air Force to evacuate its base at Kweilin.

The Kweilin evacuation, although serious, appears to have resulted in no major changes of plan by the highest military and political officers of the United Nations. For a variety of reasons strategy planners had expected the war with Japan to be bitter and long, as Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard indicated on September 21 in a talk at Princeton. They anticipated Chinese misfortune, and wondered that the Japanese had moved no more swiftly in their advance along the rail line through Hunan.

CHINESE DEFEATS DISTURBING. Nevertheless, the use of Chinese territory is essential for the Allies in defeating Japan, and the present shortcomings of the Chinese Army are deeply disturbing to Washington, even though the shortcomings have been apparent for a long time to close observers of the war on the Asiatic continent. Yet the Chinese will to resist is far from extinct. "As long as we continue our struggle resolutely and do not falter, I can assure you that militarily there is no real danger," Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek told the third plenary session of the People's Political Council in Chungking on September 5. Although the Japanese hold the great seaports of China as far south as Canton long, undefended portions of the coast are possible landing places at some future date for Allied troops who might commence the task of rolling back the Japanese.

Chinese defeats are explained by the many problems besetting the Chinese armies, which number several million soldiers. These forces are dogged but tired in their eighth year of war. Only a small num-

ber of them are adequately equipped. Most of the units lack artillery heavier than mortars. Some of the provincial troops are without rifles. For supply the armies depend on inadequate domestic industry and on foreign materials imported by an airline from India which carries only 15,000 tons of goods a month. Their officers, except those fighting in the Burma and Yunnan forces, are poorly trained, and methods of conscription are deplorable. Political problems weaken the highest leadership of the Army. The division between the Kuomintang in Chungking and the Communists in north and central China continues, although some encouragement for the settlement of this costly difference came during the session of the People's Political Council. There spokesmen for both sides aired their positions, and the Council passed a resolution appointing a committee to visit the Communist areas.

UNITED STATES CONCERNED. Chinese military difficulties have an international political meaning for the United States, whose government is responsible for the fact that China is represented at the Dumbarton Oaks conference as one of the "Big Four." Washington intends to do what it can to assist China to live up to that position, although the Administration's power to act is slight so long as transport to China remains severely limited.

On September 6 Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley arrived in Chungking to make observations on Chinese military problems that he will report to President Roosevelt. With him was Donald Nelson, former chairman of the War Production Board, who on his return on September 24 announced that he had reached an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek on plans for the wartime expansion of China's industries. The United States also plans to send some consumers' goods, chiefly cotton cloth, to China at the earliest possible moment. Although the Chinese government is a dictatorship, there are recent indications that it has relaxed its strict censorship of political discussion. "The Chinese people want to be the inhabitants of a democratic country with a constitutional government," the newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* said on September 16. "As such we demand national unity, political freedom and economic equality." The realization of the *Ta Kung Pao's* aims would improve the prospects for real Chinese influence in the post-war world.

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